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Abstract 
This study investigates the legitimacy of the relatively high interest rates charged by those 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) which have been transformed into regulated commercial 
banks using information garnered from a panel of 1232 MFIs from 107 developing countries. 
Results show that formally regulated micro banks have significantly higher average portfolio 
yields than their unregulated counterparts.  By contrast, large-scale MFIs with more than 
eight years of experience have succeeded in lowering interest rates, but only up to a certain 
cut-off point. The implication is that policies which help nascent small-scale MFIs to 
overcome their cost disadvantages form a more effective pricing strategy than do initiatives 
to transform them into regulated institutions.  
 
 
JEL classification: G21; G23; G28; E43, N20 
Key words: Microfinance, microbanks, non-bank financial institutions, interest rates, age, 
economies of scale, developing countries  
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The global microfinance movement has received intense media attention in the past decade. 
This has thrown the spotlight on two key concerns. The first is the high interest rates charged 
by microfinance institutions (MFIs) by comparison with formal sector commercial banks, 
raising allegations of monopolistic pricing (Rosenberg et al, 2009; Yunus, M, 2011). The 
second is related to fears of “mission drift” as many MFIs transform into regulated profit 
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maximizing banks with a consequent re-orientation in their services towards the better-off 
among their poor clients in order to achieve financial self-sufficiency (Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak, 2007; Frank, 2008; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2010; Mersland and Strøm 2010 and 
Roberts, 2013).  
In the early years, pioneers in microfinance lauded the promise of providers to reduce 
poverty and engineer social change in communities by lending to and collecting savings 
deposits from extremely poor households which lack the collateral to secure loans from 
formal-sector commercial banks. However, in the recent past, some advocates of 
microfinance as a development strategy have embraced the idea that the opportunity to 
achieve a sustainable large-scale programme lies in approaches which encourage MFIs to 
adopt traditional banking practices with related regulatory requirements, even if this entails 
charging higher cost-covering interest rates (Churchill and Frankiewicz, 2006; Ledgerwood 
et al, 2006; Sundaresan, 2008; Cull et al, 2008 and 2009). Such formalisation should instil 
confidence in the system and attract capital to fund investments in technology, equipment and 
staff training (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). Moreover, Robinson (2001), Drake and 
Rhyne (2002), Dehejia et al (2007) advocate that the integration of micro financial services 
into the formal sector should  enhance the growth and capability of MFIs to provide a higher 
quality of products including larger loans to an ever-growing number of beneficiaries around 
the world without a continuing reliance on subsidies. 
Ultimately the interplay between the characteristics of MFIs and the nature of the 
aforementioned concerns in the debate is an empirical matter. Unfortunately, these important 
issues have remained largely untested, primarily because of a lack of variation in the pattern 
of interest rates charged by different institutions. In this paper, we resolve this difficulty by 
using a panel framework comprising 1232 financially self-sufficient MFIs from 107 countries 
across six developing regions from the Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX) 
database
2
.The decision to focus on financially “successful” MFI’s derives from the argument 
by Rosenberg et al (2009) and Cull et al 2009 that the inclusion of subsidized unsustainable 
MFIs substantially lowered the average interest rates reported in previous studies. 
Nonetheless, Cull et al (2009) found that the correlation between financial outcomes in terms 
of operationally self-sufficiency (OSS) and financial self-sufficiency (FSS) is positively 
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significant at circa 0.89. Such a high correlation, although not perfect, indicates that the two 
measures of financial performance are somewhat interchangeable.  
This study contributes to the microfinance empirical literature in two ways. 
First, it investigates whether the annual average interest rates observed for financially 
self-sufficient (FSS) microfinance institutions with the legal entitlement to conduct traditional 
banking activities are significantly higher than the rates charged by MFIs with a different 
charter status. We differentiate between the interest rate income of rural and other 
microbanks (MICROBANKs) vis-à-vis those of non-governmental institutions (NGOs), non-
bank financial institutions (NBFIs) and credit unions/cooperatives located in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, North Africa and the Middle East, Eastern and Central Europe, East Asia, South Asia 
and Latin America regions
3
.The results should highlight the responsiveness of microcredit 
interest rates to changes in the regulatory frameworks which oversee the practices of 
microfinance banks in developing economies. A similar empirical study by Campion et al 
(2010) examined the relationship between operational self-sufficiency (OSS) and a measure 
of portfolio yield in a study of twenty-nine institutions in seven Caribbean countries from 
2005 to 2008. However, their study was constrained by data and methodological issues. This 
paper reduces these limitations by increasing the number of institutions, countries, time 
period of study and by the use of a more rigorous econometric method.  
Second, statistics show that MFIs which are classified as financially self-sufficient 
institutions by MIX analysts tend to be older with larger levels of lending. We therefore 
investigate the interaction between interest rates, scale economies and years of experience of 
microcredit providers. The outcome of this analysis should help reveal the extent to which 
policy actions which promote the learning which comes from years of practice and growth in 
the scale of an institution’s loan operations are likely to be more effective pricing strategies 
than initiatives which encourage microfinance institutions to transform into banks.  
The paper is organised into four sections. Section I provides an overview of annual 
average interest rates of those financially self-sufficient MFIs which were consistently 
reported in the MIX developing country database from 2005 to 2010. We further compare the 
variation in these annual average interest rates for selected MICROBANKs versus those of 
NGOs, NBFIs and credit unions. Section II outlines the empirical research model, hypotheses 
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and the basic features of our estimation method. Section III presents the results of our 
empirical analysis and further explains the implications of age and scale of operations for 
MICROBANKs and their clients where average interest charges are concerned. Section IV 
draws conclusions with related policies from the empirical findings.  
I. Data Description 
Our argument here is conducted under: (i) sample selection, (ii) sample distribution and (iii) 
microcredit interest rates.  
1.1: Sample Selection 
In this section, we summarise the pattern in the actual annual average interest income earned 
by our different types of financially self-sufficient MFIs of different age and scale between 
2005 and 2010 using a standard descriptive statistical method. The choice of time-span 
considered is limited by the availability of time series data on interest yield and its four major 
components — cost of funds,  operating costs, loan loss provision rate and profits4.The 
information on these variables is obtained from the MIX website only so as to ensure 
conformity and reliability in their measurement. Notwithstanding these benefits, Cull et al 
(2007), Gonzalez (2007), Cotler and Almazan (2013) and Nwachukwu (2013a) expressed 
concern regarding the self-selection bias inherent in the MIX dataset. They noted that the 
more successful MFIs with adequate information systems are more likely than others to 
expose their private financial accounts to external examination and to satisfy the minimum 
requirements of auditing firms and MIX analysts. In an anticipatory variation of the 
uncertainty principle, the knowledge that they will be closely observed by financial analysts, 
will further improve the quality of their submission. Nevertheless, the MIX database is 
commonly used in the microfinance empirical literature on the assumption that those 
institutions which report to the organisation collectively serve a sufficiently large fraction of 
active microcredit users worldwide. 
Annual data on interest yield and its above-mentioned four key components is 
available for 1232 sustainable micro lenders located in 107 countries throughout our six 
developing regions. These comprise those institutions reporting on these crucial variables for 
at least three out of the six years of study. Given the time period considered and the number 
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of data points which these institutions reported to MIX, we were able to generate an 
unbalanced cross section-time series panel data of 3980 observations. Appendix Table 1 
reports the mean for all the variables which underlie our analysis for our five classes of MFIs 
subdivided across their age and scale of their lending operations.  
 
1.2: Sample Distribution 
Figures 1A and 1B show the distribution of our dataset across the different types of our 
sustainable microcredit providers, as well as in terms of their age and scale of operations in 
that order. Figure 1A shows that our sample of study is dominated by NGOs and NBFIs. 
Collectively, these supposedly socially-orientated MFIs make up two-thirds of our sample. 
The fact that these MFIs form the largest proportion of our dataset, and by inference that of 
the microfinance sector as a whole, should not be a surprise. This indicates that the recent 
concentration on microbanks in the media does not merit their relative importance.  
As shown in Figure 1B, the majority of financially-viable NGOs are mature, small to 
medium scale programmes with gross profit margin in excess of 40 percent. By contrast, 
more than half of our NBFIs, which may include registered moneylenders, micro-insurance 
firms, micro-equity institutions, pawn shops, payday lenders, check cashing firms and 
currency exchanges, are probably new initiatives which have mostly been set up in the past 
five years by large-scale institutions. Their profit margins are evenly spread across our 
chosen three sub-samples of profitability. This is probably an indication of the wide diversity 
of type and number of institutions, financial contracts, products and services offered.  
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1.3: Microcredit Interest Rates 
The yield on microloans (YLD) is calculated by MIX analysts as the sum of all interest, fees 
and commissions actually received by an MFI weighted by the size of its outstanding gross 
loan portfolio (GLP) averaged over the period of study. Figures 2A and 2B show the annual 
average interest income earned by our financially viable MFIs reported by the type, age and 
scale of their operations respectively. We use nominal rather than real interest yield in order 
to capture the higher risk of defaults, costs of administration and other complications faced 
by MFIs which charge the comparatively high interest rates which cover inflation. In any 
event, as observed by Woller and Schreiner (2002), the nominal portfolio yield is highly 
positively correlated with the real yield. Thus, nominal rather than real portfolio yield is 
widely used in the literature as a proxy for the actual interest rate charged on loans.    
The statistics in both figures 2A and 2B indicate that the annual average interest 
income for a typical financially self-sufficient MFI in the MIX developing country database 
(hereafter referred to as MIX-MFI) was 32.86 percent of gross loan portfolios (GLP) 
outstanding. This is comparable with the mean real gross portfolio yield of 35.4 percent 
reported by Cull et al (2007).  
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A disentangling of data by type of MFI shows a wide variation in the average interest rate 
charged. Contrary to popular belief, the highest average interest rates of between 34.31 
percent and 36.58 percent per annum were observed for NGOs and NBFIs in that order. This 
is presumably because NGOs and NBFIs are expected to lend to the poorest households 
without collateral and so have higher premium for risk. Moreover, these deprived clients 
borrow in small amounts and therefore also have greater unit administration costs, not to 
mention the cost of foreign and vehicles employment by NGOs in particular. Besides, these 
underprivileged borrowers may be more concerned with access to capital rather than “cheap” 
loans. They therefore could be unresponsive to price increases, permitting those MFIs which 
purport to serve them to offer credit at considerably high interest rates. What is more, the 
absence of effective regulation and public scrutiny may have allowed such institutions to 
charge interest rates which are significantly higher than their average costs, compared with 
microfinance banks which often attract intense media attention and possible censure. Thus, 
decisions on whether sustainable NGOs and NBFIs are meeting their professed social 
obligations must be based on the presumption that any subsequent relatively high profits are 
channelled into initiatives which ultimately reduce average interest charges. 
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The group of credit unions charging the lowest average rates at 23.01 percent a year, 
compared with the 29.94 percent for rural banks and 31.17 percent for other types of 
microbanks. The comparatively low interest rates levied by credit unions are to be expected. 
These are not-for-profit cooperative financial institutions owned by their members who pool 
their money to provide loans and other financial services. This should reduce the need to raise 
finance from more expensive external sources, leading to a lower cost of basic finance and 
the interest rate therefrom. Then too, the profits from other services, notably from marketing 
members’ inputs and outputs, may be used to cross-subsidize interest rates and extract 
repayment of loans. Besides, the cooperative structure of credit unions is designed to ensure 
fair dealing. Consequently, interest rates which are deemed to be “excessively” high are 
unlikely to be countenanced by members. Additionally, members and borrowers of credit 
unions are often the same people and so are jointly responsible for the administration and 
repayment of loans. This sense of collective liability doubtless leads to lower default rates 
and management costs with a consequent decline in interest rates. Also, credit unions are 
often local institutions and, as shown in Figure 1B, are mostly mature small scale operations. 
They are therefore more likely to offer more personalised customer services to users and to 
know more about the creditworthiness of their borrowers.  
Another discernible pattern across the MFIs in Figures 2A and 2B is the low interest 
rate observed for rural banks by comparison to their other bank counterparts. Normally one 
would expect that the lack of competition in village micro-credit markets would enable banks 
there to charge interest rates that might look abnormally high when compared with those of 
other bank providers. The implication is that rural microbanks, like traditional village 
moneylenders, have acquired a comparative advantage in drawing up credit contracts which 
help mitigate those adverse selection and moral hazard problems that have discouraged urban 
providers from lending to poor borrowers. Further, it is more likely that the majority of rural 
banks are government-sponsored agricultural lending agencies, often with a cap on their 
rates, although it has to be admitted that government banks often suffer from high default 
rates as borrowers see no need to repay a public institution (Nwachukwu, 2013b). 
A further disaggregation by age and size of operation in Figures 2A and 2B 
respectively indicates that interest rates tend to decline with the age and scale of an average 
financially sustainable MFI regardless of its legal intermediation status. Standard economic 
theory would lead us to suppose that reductions in costs driven by experience, learning by 
doing, economies of scale and growing competition are responsible for the lower interest 
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rates observed for mature and large scale MFIs. So for established institutions with more than 
eight years’ experience, microcredit interest rates dropped to an average of 30.89 percent a 
year, representing a fall of 1.97 percentage point from the overall sample average of 32.86 
percent of gross loan portfolios. In terms of scale, Figure 2B implies that the drop in interest 
rates accompanying increases in the value of gross loan portfolios outstanding was larger 
than the fall in rates arising from variations in the age of an MFI. For example, for the large-
scale MIX-MFI, the mean interest rate was 28.83 percent per annum vis-à-vis the 30.89 
percent observed for a representative mature microlender; a difference of 2.06 percentage 
points. Once again, separation by type of MFI suggests that the implied inverse relationship 
between age and scale economies against interest rates is more pronounced across our NBFI 
sub-sample.  
Generally speaking, two key issues emerge from our summary statistics in this 
section. First, there is an indication that a quicker way to lower microcredit rates is for 
providers, especially those in the newly established non-bank financial sector, to pay closer 
attention to those costs which tend to fall with the scale of lending operations. Such scale 
economies arising from lending to more clients and/or by increasing the value, duration and 
range of borrowing facilities offered to existing clients with a good credit history would make 
the provision of microcredit more efficient. Second, the effect of age and scale economies 
appears to be closely correlated, especially for the NBFI category. This outcome is almost 
certainly a consequence of the fact that it takes time to understand and exploit opportunities 
for cost efficiencies embodied in large scale microcredit operations. The implication is that an 
interaction term which combines MFI’s age and scale of lending over time should be 
included in any empirical study which claims to investigate the effect of the two variables on 
interest charges. The regression model which we employ in this study to analyse how age and 
scale economies affect annual interest rates of selected operationally self-sufficient MFIs in 
the MIX developing country database is outlined in the next section.   
 
2. Empirical Model and Hypotheses 
The argument in this section is carried out under the following headings: (i) model 
specification, (ii) variables of interest, (iii) control variables and expected relationships and 
(iv) empirical estimation method. 
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2.1: Model Specification 
This paper investigates how financially self-sufficient microfinance institutions may 
influence their interest revenue through: (i) the adoption of traditional banking practices, (ii) 
knowledge acquired by serving clients over time and (iii) scale economies achieved by 
serving a growing number of borrowers and/or by increasing the average size and duration of 
a loan. The model which we use to capture the influence of these three characteristics of 
MFIs on interest rates can be expressed in terms of the following regression equation. 
 
The variable YLD was defined previously in section 1.3 as the gross loan portfolio yield on 
microloans. 
2.2: Variables of Interest 
The independent variables of particular interest comprised: (i) the entry MATURE is a 
dichotomous dummy variable indicating the number of years the institution has been 
operating. Following the classification by MIX analysts, this variable takes a value 0 if the 
institution has less than eight years of operation and 1 otherwise. The decision to merge the 
NEW (i.e., age < 5 years) and the YOUNG (i.e., age between 5 and 8 years) variables to 
create a “NEW-YOUNG” dummy series follows from a lack of sufficient observations for 
each individual category in our dataset. (ii) The notations for MSCALE and LSCALE are 
dummy variables for medium and large-scale institutions which are entered in our 
specification independently in that order.(iii) The term MICROBANK is a dummy variable 
for  microfinance banks which takes a value of 1 if the MFI is classified as a “rural bank” or 
“bank” and 0 for our three other types of institutions —NGOs, NBFIs and credit unions or 
cooperative societies. This sub-sample of institutions which do not have an authorised license 
to carry out conventional banking activities is collectively hereafter referred to as “NON-
BANK-MFIs”. The decision not to include separate dummies for each type of MFI (rural 
versus other types of bank) in the equation was based on the fact that there were too few 
observations for them. The dummies for NEW-YOUNG, SMALL-SCALE and NON-
BANKMFIs are excluded from the regression to avoid an exact linear association between 
12 
 
the three dummies and the intercept term. This means that the constant term  represents the 
annual average interest charge for these omitted classes of sustainable MFIs. Our null 
hypothesis is that the differential intercept coefficients  are less than zero. These 
parameters capture the dissimilarity in the annual average interest rates between the 
respective age and scale measurement and the corresponding new-young and small-scale 
microcredit providers.  
The coefficient  shows how the annual average interest income varies across MFIs 
by the nature of their accredited activities. We propose that the coefficient  will have a 
negative sign. This follows from the expectation that microfinance banks are more cost- 
efficient than the other types of MFIs, presumably because they are in more direct 
competition with conventional commercial banks. We hypothesise that microbanks are 
relatively more innovative than our other types of MFIs, both in terms of their sources of 
funds and in their types and methods of delivery of financial products. However, Christen et 
al (2003) suggested that the coefficient  may have a positive sign. They remarked that the 
extra costs to microfinance banks of complying with formalisation and prudential regulations 
was as much as five percent of assets in the first year of transition, declining to around one 
percent in subsequent years. Sustainable MFIs will ultimately pass these additional regulatory 
costs onto their borrowers in the form of higher interest rates. 
As MFIs get older, they normally attempt to increase their customer base and also 
make progressively larger-sized loans to their existing clients with successful businesses. To 
investigate the significance of the implied combined effects on interest rates of age, scale 
economies and organisational charter, we include simultaneously in our regression model 
three interaction dummy variables. The combinations (MATURE*MSCALE) and 
(MATURE*LSCALE) are created by multiplying the dummies for mature with medium and 
large scale MFIs in that order. It is anticipated that the slope differential coefficients 
 will have negative signs to reflect the additional productivity gains enjoyed by 
well-established MFIs that exploit scale economies by comparison with their new-young and 
small-scale enterprises, irrespective of license type.  
We differentiate between interest charges borne by borrowers from mature-medium-
large scale microbanks versus NEW-YOUNG microbanks, by introducing an interaction term 
(MATURE*MSCALE*LSCALE*MICROBANK). We predict that the differential slope  
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is negative in recognition of the fact that mature-medium-large microbanks are more likely to 
have improved governance and internal controls and to be better at coping with the risk and 
cost associated with regulation and its supervision. Such should instil confidence in external 
finance providers and depositors, leading to a lower cost of funding with a corresponding fall 
in interest charges. Also, it is expected that established large microbanks have acquired the 
experience and scale economies needed to manage and price microcredit risk better. They 
should therefore have lower cost structures with an associated decline in their interest rates. 
 
2.3: Control Variables and Expected Relationships 
The symbol in equation 2 is a vector comprising the set of control variables drawn from a 
pool of potential determinants theoretically or empirically linked to changes in interest rates 
on microloans in the microfinance literature. Generally speaking, discussions by Christen 
(2000), Woller and Schreiner (2010) indicated that several empirical studies which use the 
MBB dataset have consistently found the following ten institutional characteristics to be 
important drivers of interest rates on microbanking loans aside from the age and scale 
variables described in section 2.2. These ten conditioning variables have been added 
simultaneously to our extended regression in equation 2. 
 
The first information-conditioning variable is FELR, measured as the ratio of the cost of 
funds to gross loan portfolio for an MFI. The coefficient captures the effect on microcredit 
rates of policies affecting the terms and the amount providers pay for their funds. A 
tightening in the terms, conditions and diversity of funding sources would raise the average 
finance-expense ratio, causing a rise in interest rates. This implies a positive coefficient. 
The second variable, OPER, is the ratio of operating expenses to gross loan portfolio. 
This is used to proxy the efficiency with which an MFI delivers its loans to its clients. We 
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would expect that sustainable MFIs with higher operating cost structures would charge higher 
interest rates. This suggests that the coefficient  will have a positive sign. Nevertheless, 
Campion et al (2010) and Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) observed that the imposition of 
interest rate caps by some developing country governments, such as in Ecuador, may push 
profit-orientated MFIs to lower costs by targeting wealthier borrowers who borrow larger 
amounts and for longer periods. Such would result in an inverse relationship between average 
portfolio yield and operating costs. Therefore, we cannot conclude beforehand what the sign 
on the coefficient  will be. 
The interest rate consequences of the money set aside by MFIs to cover potential loan 
defaults are captured by the third conditioning variable PLFR. It is hypothesised that 
microcredit interest rates will be higher when provisions for loan impairment rise. This is 
because increases in the level of provisioning represent an expected loss of revenue and 
opportunities forgone for the lender (Cotler and Almazan, 2013).  Thus, a positive sign is 
anticipated for the coefficient. 
The fourth control variable, PROFTR, is profit measured as net operating income 
relative to gross loan portfolio. It is expected that MFIs which wish to increase profit per unit 
of loans would have to raise their lending interest rates. This indicates a positive 
correlation  between portfolio yield and profit margin. But Campion et al (2010) pointed 
out that profitable MFIs are more likely to invest in initiatives needed to improve the quality 
and range of services provided to both existing and as yet un-served clients. Any subsequent 
reduction in costs should contribute to lowering interest rates in the long-term, leading to a 
negative  coefficient. Besides, those MFIs which raise profit targets are normally subjected 
to public pressure to cut their microcredit interest rates. Fear of such concerted civic protests 
has resulted in a fall in interest rates in the past. Consequently, the sign on the coefficient  
cannot be ascertained a priori. 
The quality of an institution’s loan portfolio is measured by our fifth control 
variablePAR30. This is the proportion of an MFI’s loans that have one or more principal 
instalments unpaid for more than thirty days past their due date. Thus, a rise in this variable 
indicates a deterioration in the quality of an MFI’s loan portfolio. We theorise that MFIs with 
poor portfolio quality are unable to contain their costs, leading to higher interest rates. This 
implies a positive sign on the coefficient . 
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The sixth variable in our conditioning set is, WBR. This represents the proportion of 
women borrowers which supposedly captures the depth of outreach to the underprivileged 
population by an MFI (Woller and Schreiner, 2002). Evidence shows that socially-oriented 
MFIs tend to serve a greater fraction of females than males, primarily to overcome cultural 
biases against females (Cull et al, 2007; Campion et al, 2010). Further, women are normally 
targeted by programmes with pro-poor goals because women are more likely to spend 
earnings from their microbusiness on their family’s welfare, including their children’s 
education, nutrition and health (ILO, 2008; Campionet al, 2010). However, women also tend 
to live in rural areas and take smaller loans compared to men. This drives up the operating 
costs of any lender who targets them. The implication of such extra costs of serving an 
increasing share of female borrowers is represented by a potential positive sign on the 
coefficient . On the other hand, observers have noted that female borrowers are more likely 
to repay their loans on time which lowers loan-loss provisions. This last argument lends 
support to the hypothesis that MFIs which serve a higher percentage of women are more 
inclined to charge lower interest rates. It seems that the evidence from the literature on the 
relationship between interest rates and the percentage of women clients is inconclusive (Pitt 
and Khandker, 1998, Brau and Woller, 2004).  
The seventh conditioning variable BPSM is the ratio of borrowers to staff members. It 
is included to approximate the relationship between interest charges and the effectiveness 
with which an MFI manages its human resources. A typical client for an MFI tends to be 
uneducated and to be poor at keeping records of business earnings and repayment history. 
MFI staff must spend a lot of time in the screening and monitoring of prospective clients and 
their businesses, as well as in helping customers to understand the features of the institution’s 
financial products, evaluating the feasibility of the project for which they want to borrow and 
completing loan application forms. A rise in the BPSM variable may be construed as a sign 
that the MFI is succeeding in dealing with these borrower deficiencies without a 
corresponding increase in the number of employees. Any consequent reduction in personnel 
costs per unit loaned should be correlated with a fall in annual average interest charges. A 
negative sign is therefore anticipated for the coefficient . Alternatively, more borrowers per 
staff member may result in a cost-raising deterioration in the quality of services and the 
supervision of loans. Olomola (2001) and Nwachukwu (2013b) pointed out that an increase 
in the BPSM ratio may be a sign that the institution is cutting down on the number of 
employees. Any subsequent reduction in the number of staff for site visits, loan monitoring 
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and recovery can raise the default rate and related interest charges. The foregoing implies that 
the effect on interest rates of the number borrowers relative to staff members as represented 
by the sign on the coefficient may be either positive or negative depending on the level of 
education and creditworthiness of the borrowers. 
The eighth control variable in our equation two is ECAR which is represented as the 
ratio of equity capital to total assets. Existing research on the capital structure of MFIs is 
posited within the context of the life cycle theory of institutional development (Farrington 
and Abrams, 2002; Fehr & Hishigsuren, 2004; Helms, 2006; and Bogan et al, 2007). 
According to the life cycle approach, funding patterns are linked to the stage of development 
of the MFI. Traditional equity finance, as opposed to grants-in-aid and concessional loans 
from donors, comprise the majority of the funding in the later stages of an organization. In 
this mature phase, many MFIs are large scale enterprises and will have established internal 
control and management structures needed for complying with prudential and market 
regulations. They are therefore more likely to have obtained an investment grade rating which 
should help them attract more equity finance from private investors.  Thus, a rise in the equity 
capital ratio may be regarded as an indication that the MFI is a mature large scale 
organisation and requires access to long-term equity to further expand and/or improve the 
range and quality of its services. A significant positive correlation coefficient  would 
indicate that a typical MFI experienced a considerable increase in the operating costs of 
meeting the regulatory obligations, including the expansion of physical and intellectual 
capital to handle the additional legal and reporting demands (Sinkey and Carter, 2000; 
Christen et al, 2003). Such extra costs will be passed on to customers through higher interest 
rates. A negative relationship, on the other hand, suggests that, on average, our MFIs used the 
proceeds from newly issued equity capital to recapitalise by repurchasing outstanding debt in 
order to meet a required capital adequacy ratio regulation. Any subsequent reduction in the 
likelihood of bankruptcy should lower the cost of funding with an associated decline in 
interest rates. This means that the sign on the  may not be confirmed beforehand.  
The ninth variable, ALPBP, is the average loan size per borrower relative to the per 
capita GNI of the country in which the institution is located. The smaller the average loan 
size, the larger the probable fraction of the poorest borrowers served by the institution. In 
fact, information from MIX indicates that socially-oriented MFIs which cater for the financial 
needs of deprived borrowers at the low-end of the credit market tend to make small-sized 
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loans of less than 20 percent of the per capita GNI of the country in which they operate. But 
because each loan application goes through a similar cost of vetting process, we expect that 
total operating costs with their associated interest rates will be higher for MFIs with more 
outstanding small loans than their counterparts with fewer, larger credits. Thus, a positive 
correlation coefficient  could be expected if those institutions most focused on a social 
mission charged higher interest rates to offset the greater unit transaction costs of providing 
an increased number of small average loan amounts to disadvantaged borrowers.  
The final variable in our conditioning set is ALPBPSQ. This is the square of an 
average loan-size per borrower per capita GNI used as a proxy for an institution’s outreach to 
the wealthier borrowers capable of servicing larger loan sizes. The decision to include this 
quadratic term follows from the observation by Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) that the 
greatest challenge facing most MFIs is how to recompense for the high fixed cost of lending 
in small amounts. Cotler and Almazan(2013) noted that most financially self-sustaining 
MFIs, especially those which operate in countries where rates are capped, are tempted to deal 
with this concern by re-orientating their services towards wealthier borrowers with the 
capacity to service larger loans. Evidence shows that the consequent lower costs are passed 
on to borrowers in the form of lower interest charges. Further, MFIs that make larger loans 
are more likely to want their borrowers to pledge collateral which, in turn, lowers interest 
rates. Moreover, if larger loans are made progressively to the more experienced and educated 
class of borrowers with successful businesses, then the operational costs and the risk of 
default should decline and with them interest rates. We would therefore expect to find a 
negative correlation coefficient between interest rates and the squared-average loan size 
variable. 
The symbol  is a dummy variable representing the effects of those unobserved 
characteristics which are unique to a particular  MFI and which do not vary over time . 
These institution-specific dummies are treated as either fixed or random parameters 
depending on the outcome of a test proposed by Hausman (1978)
5
. The symbol  is a 
dummy variable for time. These time indices are also treated as fixed or random in order to 
capture the dynamic changes in the rate of interest over our six years of study. The notation 
 is the white noise disturbance term with an expected value of zero. 
                                                             
5
 The results of the Hausman test for fixed versus random model is not reported here in order to conserve space. 
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2.4: Empirical Estimation Method 
To test the validity of the above-mentioned hypotheses on the relationship between nominal 
interest income and its key determinants, we employ two estimation techniques. The first is a 
basic correlation analysis which considers the degree of linear association between interest 
rates and each individual control variable. We estimate the Kendall tau  rank correlation 
coefficient which deals with the problem of outlying observations and ties in the orderings of 
data. The second method is a multivariate regression model in which the dependent and 
explanatory variables are presented in equation 2 above.  
The single expression in equation 2 assumes that all the right-hand-side (RHS) 
variables are exogenous in the sense that their values are determined outside the microcredit 
pricing system. But representations in Section 1 imply that this is a rather simplistic 
assumption. Besides, arguments in previous empirical studies by Rosenberg (2007), Hudon 
(2007), Kinsley (2008), Cull et al (2009),Campion (2010) and Cullet al (2011) suggest that 
there is probably a causal link between interest income and the institutional characteristics 
contained in our information conditioning set. What is more, the result of a Hausman test for 
exogeneity indicates that all the control variables described in section 2.3 are indeed jointly 
determined within our regression model and so must be treated as endogenous variables
6
. 
This is to be expected as these variables represent the institutional features which managers 
seek to influence in order to achieve optimal pricing for their niche market. Thus, the 
treatment of these variables as exogenous in a number of articles, including the influential 
paper by Cull et al (2007) which uses an Ordinary Least Squares estimator, is invalid. 
A potential solution for endogenous regressors would be to run a distributed lag 
model in which the current value of our dependent variable  depends on the previous 
values of the explanatory variables in our conditional set . But, as explained by Brooks 
(2008), the use of lagged variables in a regression violates the classical linear regression 
model assumption that explanatory variables are non-stochastic. Then too, most functional 
forms with lagged variables are over-identified and therefore could produce biased 
coefficient estimates. Besides, the coefficient estimates of such distributed lag regressions are 
difficult to interpret and may not accurately reflect the financial theory which originally 
motivated the empirical analysis. One technique frequently used for the estimation of systems 
                                                             
6
 Once again, for the sake of brevity, the results of the Hausman test for exogeneity are not reported here, but are 
available on request from the author. 
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of equations when contemporaneous variables are specified as endogenous is the Two Stage 
Least Squares (2SLS).The perennial problem of choosing valid instruments from freely 
available data is resolved by employing two period lagged values of all the variables in our 
conditioning set. Ideally, the restrictions placed on the choice of appropriate instruments and 
lag lengths should be informed by financial and economic theories. But often these theories 
are at best vague or at worst non-existent. As a result, searching for exogenous variables to be 
used as instruments in simultaneous specifications has been carried out in an ad hoc manner. 
It has been argued that the measurement error associated with such an unplanned selection of 
external instruments could be minimised by using the VAR approach (Sims, 1980; McNees, 
1986). With respect to lag lengths, our priority was to include as many cross-sections of MFIs 
as possible in our regression analysis while ensuring that each of these institutions has data 
for at least three out of our six years.  
We recognise that the components of our regression equation which are expressed at 
natural logarithm levels may contain unit roots and so should have been differenced to induce 
stationarity. Nonetheless, the resolution to run the regression at level follows from the fact 
that the objective of this article is to examine the relationship between interest rates and key 
MFI characteristics. Differencing would have resulted in a loss of any long-run information 
on the correlation between these variables. In any event, the influence of non-stationarity on 
the behaviour and properties of data is less pronounced for our panel dataset which comprises 
a large cross section of 1232 operationally self-sufficient MFIs with a relatively short-term 
time period of six years. Besides, the transformation of all the regressors into natural 
logarithm series helps to lessen the problem of spurious regression by ensuring that the 
variables follow a linear trend and are integrated (Asteriou and Hall, 2007, Brooks, 2008). 
The problem of multicollinearity is a key concern in multiple regression models. But, 
results in Appendix Table 2 indicate that the degree of interdependence between our 
explanatory variables is relatively low at under 0.5. Indeed, multicollinearity is rarely a 
problem in dynamic panels which pool a large cross-section of institutions from different 
countries over a relatively short-time period. Such a data arrangement reduces the likelihood 
that the same common trend will be prevalent in the regressors in the model specification.  
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3. Estimation Results 
This section presents our empirical results under (i) correlation and (ii) regression analysis. 
 
3.1: Correlation Analysis 
Appendix Table 2 reports the contemporaneous pairwise correlation matrix of our selected 
control variables based on the Kendall tau-b matrix. As expected, the positive linear 
association between microcredit interest rates and operating expenses is the strongest. This is 
consistent with the observation by Rosenberg et.al (2009) that such costs make up the bulk of 
interest charges. The relatively high correlation coefficient of 0.49 indicates that the provision 
of microloans is a high-cost activity. As a business model, the greatest challenge is to lower 
operating expenses both in terms of those for personnel and for administration. Other 
institutional characteristics with estimated positive correlation coefficients include cost of 
funding, loan-loss provision, profit margins, fraction of women borrowers and the ratio of 
equity to total assets.  
Contrary to expectation, the sign on the coefficient for the average loan balance per 
capita GNI is negative. We may therefore infer that the majority of our financially self-
sufficient MFIs have not crossed the cut-off point at which potential gains from larger loans 
are lost. This phenomenon may be explained by the fact that many profitable MFIs now 
employ the so-called “credit–plus” approach. This involves the provision of additional 
business development services, including health, consultancy, marketing and record keeping 
instructions to borrowers in order to enhance the size and productivity of the loans provided.  
Surprisingly, interest income is inversely correlated with the proportion of loans that 
have passed their due date by thirty days. This unexpected outcome is consistent with the 
allegation that the LPAR30 series is a conservative measure of portfolio quality (Armendáriz 
and Morduch, 2010). The inclusion of all principal instalments unpaid after a month of their 
expected date ignores the benefits of missed balances that are eventually repaid. Then too, the 
worsening in the risk of default as signalled by a rise in this variable does not account for the 
fact that MFIs have a good knowledge of their customers and their business environment. 
They are therefore able to discern when non-repayment is due to genuine hardship, rather 
than shirking. A significant negative coefficient for the LPAR30 variable suggests that when 
loan default is proven to be due to a real deterioration in the financial circumstances of their 
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clients, our typical MFI may have elected to restructure or reschedule the terms of lending 
either through a cut in interest rate or an extension of the repayment period. The decision not 
to punish those honest clients who have fallen on hard times with higher rate charges is 
probably in recognition of the original social mission of the microfinance movement. 
Another unexpected result in Appendix Table 2 is the relatively low positive 
correlation of 0.25 between loss provisions (LPFLR) and the percentage of loans at risk of 
default after 30 days (LPAR30). There is an inference that MFIs are not putting aside enough 
money to deal with the difficulties which may emerge with missed instalments. Besides, as 
noted by Armendáriz and Morduch (2010), MFIs may not consider information from the 30-
day PAR when deciding on the ratio of loss provision. They may rather use the 60-day or 90-
day ratios, presumably because of the belief that missed repayments are eventually recovered 
months after their due date. Nevertheless, the extent to which the pairwise correlations in 
Column 1 are biased by the simultaneous exclusion of the other MFI characteristics used as 
explanatory variables in our multivariate regression in equation 2 will be explored in the next 
section.   
3.2: Regression Analysis 
The outcomes of our estimation for equations 1 and 2 using the 2SLS method are presented in 
Columns 1 and 2 of Appendix Table 3 in that order. The regression in Column 2 highlights 
how the sign, size and statistical significance of the coefficients on our key variables of 
interest —age, scale economies and microbanking dummies— vary with the concurrent 
inclusion of our choice of conditioning variables. It is noteworthy that the regression in 
Column 2, has the highest adjusted R-squared and F-statistic. Besides a Durbin-Watson 
statistic of 2.04 indicates a lack of first-order serial correlation in the disturbance terms. 
Consequently, much of our argument here is based on the estimates from the regression 
presented in Column 2. The discussion is organised under: (i) age, scale and microcredit 
interest rates, (ii) microbanking and (iii) other MFI characteristics 
 
3.2.1. Age, scale and microcredit interest rates: The results in Appendix Table 3 indicate 
that the relationship between age, economies of scale and interest rates is sensitive to our set 
of conditioning variables simultaneously included in the regression model. For example, we 
reported in Column 1, that, on average, a mature MFI with more than eight years of 
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experience has a marginally higher average portfolio yield than new-young institutions, even 
if this finding is weak from a statistical viewpoint. In Column 2, the coefficient on the age 
variable (i.e., MATURE) reverted to the expected negative sign, although the MATURE 
dummy is still statistically insignificant. Most likely, this negative correlation is capturing the 
cost-reducing effect of a movement along a learning curve over time. As noted by Cull et al 
(2007) and Campion et al (2010), the number of years of an MFI’s operation is a proxy for 
knowledge. Established MFIs are more likely to have accurate information on the credit risk 
profile of their borrowers. They would therefore be able to adjust their lending practices, 
including the amount and terms of borrowing to suit the peculiar features of each customer.  
With respect to economies of scale, the positive coefficients on the MSCALE and 
LSCALE dummies are persistent across the two regressions, although statistically 
insignificant in the model in Column 2. Nonetheless, the results suggest that larger MFIs have 
higher average interest rates than their smaller rivals; keeping the average values of all other 
conditioning variables constant. This unexpected outcome is presumably related to the 
observation by Gonzales (2007), Rosenberg et al (2009) and Campion et al (2010) that MFIs 
are unlikely to experience any additional reductions in their costs from scale economies once 
they have grown beyond a certain number of borrowers. Then too, this anomaly may be 
because of the self-reporting bias in the MIX data underlying our regression. As we pointed 
out in Section 1.1, the MIX data is unrepresentative of the microfinance landscape in the 
developing world in the sense that it likely comprises the more successful, larger-end of the 
distribution of MFIs. 
Given the probable bias in the size of the MFIs that comprise our sample, we 
investigate the extent to which the age of operation could also be an influential factor on the 
relationship between scale and interest rates. The significant negative sign of the coefficient 
on the interaction terms MATURE*MSCALE and MATURE*LSCALE in our basic 
regression in Column 1 is consistent with the null hypothesis in Section 2.1, even if the 
coefficients were later found to be insignificantly different from zero at the conventional five 
percent level in the extended regression in Column 2. Nevertheless, we may infer that well-
established medium-large scale MFIs have slightly lower annual average interest rates than 
new-young small ones. Older MFIs have learned how to structure their loan sizes and pricing 
policy to the credit history as well as the income-expenditure stream of their clientele. This 
has allowed our mature- medium-large institutions to marginally extend the cut-off point 
beyond which gains from economies of scale are predicted to dissipate.  
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3.2.2. Microbanking and microcredit interest rates: The significant positive coefficient of 
0.30 on the MICROBANK dummy in Column 2 conforms with the assertion by Christen 
et.al (2003) that the extra costs of becoming a formal regulated microbank are passed on to 
borrowers through a higher average portfolio yield than our unregulated non-bank MFIs. This 
statement is further supported by the positive coefficient of our interaction variable 
MATURE*MSCALE*LSCALE*MICROBANK, even if this is insignificantly different from 
zero. It appears that established medium-large microbanks charge slightly higher interest 
rates than their new-young counterparts, probably because they face greater scrutiny with 
associated regulatory and supervisory costs. Also, as we said earlier, mature microbanks are 
in more direct competition with much larger traditional commercial banks. Thus, the positive 
coefficient here may be linked to the effect of competition on outreach. For example, as 
competition intensifies, microbanks may be pushed to establish new branches in poorer 
neighbourhoods and in more remote villages in search of new customers using existing 
technology and lending approaches. It seems that such drives into new markets are related to 
higher personnel and administrative costs and possibly an increase in non-repayment rates. 
Nonetheless, we may infer from the statistically insignificant positive coefficients on the 
microbanking interaction terms that only a few well-established large microbanks were able 
to adequately raise their interest rates to cover the extra cost of this transformation. 
 
3.2.3. Other MFI characteristics and microcredit interest rates: Analysis of our regression 
model in Column 2 identified five out of our ten control variables as statistically significant 
drivers of interest rates at the conventional five-percent level. 
The significantly positive correlation coefficients which were estimated for the two 
cost components of interest rates —cost of funds (LFELR) and operating cost (LOPELR), are 
consistent with our prediction.  
The positive sign of the net profit variable (LPRFTLR) is statistically significant. 
Contrary to the claim by Rosenberg et.al (2009), the relatively large size of this coefficient 
suggests that the quest for profits is the most important reason for the differences in the 
lending interest rates among financially self-sufficient MFIs. A one percentage point increase 
in anticipated net profit per unit of loan portfolio will raise nominal portfolio yield by 0.14 
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percent, after accounting for the impact of the other regressors in the equation specifications. 
The results also show that the size of the coefficients on the profit variable is nearly double 
that for each of our unit cost components. This indicates that sustainable MFIs, in their search 
for profit maximisation, raise interest rates by almost twice that of associated increases in the 
total unit cost of lending. Such may be taken as evidence of “mission drift” unless we 
presume that the higher profit is re-invested in the expansion of outreach to underserved 
poorer communities. 
The entries in Column 2 indicate that the borrowers per staff ratio (LBPSR) is the 
only other control variable whose relationship with interest income is statistically 
significantly at the five percent level. Most notably, we found that contrary to the pecking 
order capital structure theory, interest rates charged by MFIs that use the more expensive 
external equity capital to finance larger loans is comparable to those charged by their 
counterparts that rely on internally generated funds such as retained profit. In line with this 
finding, we may therefore surmise that there is little or no risk that microcredit interest rates 
will be raised as more and more MFIs shift their funding structures towards purely 
commercial investment in the wake of the on-going budgetary problems faced by western 
donor governments. 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
The objective of this paper has been to discover how interest rates charged by financially 
self-sufficient MFIs respond to: (i) knowledge which comes from the age of an institution,(ii) 
scale economies and (iii) changes in an institution’s charter through the adoption of 
conventional banking practices. It focuses on annual time-series panel data for1232 
operationally self-sufficient MFIs from 107 countries across six developing regions from 
2005 to 2010. Using basic descriptive statistics, pairwise correlation analysis and a two-stage 
least squares regression estimator, we uncovered three key discernible patterns in the 
behaviour of microcredit interest rates. These underlying trends with related policies may be 
summarised as follows: 
First, the insignificantly negative coefficient on the institutional age variable indicates 
that older MFIs with more than eight years’ experience have acquired a slender comparative 
advantage from possessing historical records of the income and expenditure streams of their 
clients. Such could have allowed them to make progressively larger loan sizes to repeating 
customers at comparatively lower rates than their new-younger rivals. With respect to 
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organisational scale variable, we found a positively insignificant coefficient. We may 
postulate that the cost competitive advantage enjoyed by medium and large institutions 
vanishes after a certain cut-off point. However, the negative coefficient on the age-scale 
interaction term suggests that a handful of well-established large MFIs have succeeded in 
slightly raising this threshold beyond which gains from scale economies will dissolve.  
An important public policy initiative for reducing the price of lending which may be 
adduced from these results are that governments should encourage the older and more 
efficient MFIs to increase institutional scale by merging and/or acquiring new-young MFIs. 
In addition, the authorities should promote campaigns in the media and within the institutions 
themselves to disseminate lessons learned by mature providers. Furthermore, MFIs with less 
than eight years of experience can mitigate their cost disadvantages by investing in market 
surveys to gather client opinion on various aspects of the services which they have received 
(Campion et al, 2010). Then too, staff of nascent MFIs in particular may be trained on how to 
use new technologies, such as credit scoring to collect, record and use information on client 
credit risk profiles to determine the charge on, and amount of loan extended to each 
borrower. These initiatives should help new-young MFIs to leapfrog the difficulties 
associated with the early stages of a learning curve. 
Second, the robustness of the positive sign of the MICROBANK dummy suggests 
that the shift from socially-orientated to fully regulated micro-banking status typically leads 
to higher interest rates for customers of banks of all ages and scales. The inference is that 
such a transformation imposes extra costs on microbanks and that these expenses are 
eventually passed onto their customers.  
Broadly speaking, our findings indicate that policy makers could lower the average 
interest rates for microbanks by reforming the prudential regulatory framework which this 
class of MFI is required to follow. Ideally, an effective regulatory structure for monitoring the 
activities of microbanks should take into account the differences in the size of their 
collateralised loan portfolios and client risk profiles vis-à-vis that of traditional commercial 
banks which are often bigger and employ more innovative technologies. Such a revision 
should ensure that compliance is not so burdensome and expensive that it leads to higher 
interest rates and/or limits the number of available microbanks which provide financial 
services to the poorest population. Then too, a government could offer financial assistance 
and technical advice to microbanks to facilitate their transformation into regulated entities. 
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Microfinance banks themselves may help mitigate the adverse effect of regulatory costs by 
expanding the range of products offered to clients in different target markets. Cross-
subsidization of expenses from various market segments and products could be used to lower 
interest rates to the poorest clients (Armendáriz and Szafarz, 2009).Raising staff productivity 
is another practice which may help lower the cost of transition to formal microbanking. 
Policy initiatives which link incentive systems with staff bonuses and training needs to 
recognisable performance targets, such as the collection of savings deposits and loan 
repayments from clients, should help improve staff morale and efficiency. Besides, 
microbanks might invest in modern technologies such as internet and telephone banking in 
order to lower their operating costs per borrower. Microbanks can further lower transaction 
costs by using mobile vans to reach more low-income clients in remote rural areas rather than 
setting up branches there. Moreover, hiring local officers with a specialised knowledge of the 
culture and locality in which borrowers live and work should help improve ease of access to, 
and communication with borrowers, but this will, of course, be done at a cost. 
Third,the pursuit of higher profit goals by sustainable MFIs, regardless of legal status, 
raises interest rates by almost double any corresponding upturn in the unit cost of lending. 
Such may be taken as evidence of “mission drift”, indicating that profit-driven shareholders 
are using their involvement to exert pressure on the pricing policy of MFIs.  
The fear that financially self-sufficient MFIs are deviating from their original mission 
may be reduced by policies which encourage profit earned to be re-invested in the institution 
itself rather than distributed to shareholders or management. Such policy actions may include 
an increase in taxes levied on profits which are not re-invested in welfare maximisation 
initiatives. Additionally, concerns about excessive profit targets could be dealt with by 
implementing policies which foster competition in the microfinance sector. These initiatives 
may involve the setting up of a regulator which overseas accountability and transparency in 
the recording and timely publication of the audited accounts of MFIs, dividend payments and 
the names of their recipients. Also, the creation of independent price comparison websites 
and agencies which rank the performance of MFIs on the core principles of investor and 
borrower protection should increase the confidence of depositors, shareholders and other 
providers of funding to MFIs. Then too, governments should try to set-up an identity system 
for its citizens together with associated credit rating bureaus to facilitate the collection and 
comparison of the profile of borrowers. This should provide incentives for participation in the 
provision on microloans by the more socially-minded MFIs and lower interest rates. Further, 
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the authorities could take out advertisements in national newspapers, on television, 
billboards, Facebook, Twitter and the other social media to encourage borrowers to seek out 
alternative lenders and to switch to cheaper providers. Besides, an aggressive campaign in the 
popular media to name and shame the directors and shareholders of MFIs that charge 
“excessively” high interest rates may force them to consider their pricing policy to ensure that 
it is in compliance with their stated social mission. 
Arguments in this paper have shown that promoting competition and encouraging the 
adoption of new technologies are important actions which governments could take to reduce 
the interest rate charged by microfinance banks in particular. However, carrying out empirical 
testing on the effect on interest income of such interactions between intensity of competition 
and type of lending technologies is very difficult because of a lack of data at local market 
levels for individual MFIs over time from widely available databases such as MIX. Such 
must be the subject of further research which uses information collected from questionnaires, 
field visits and interviews with senior management of formalised microbanks to assess how 
they adjust their interest rates to include the extra regulatory and supervision costs. It would 
also attempt to quantify the effectiveness of the various innovative approaches used by 
microbanks to mitigate the consequences of additional transformation expenses for their 
clients at different income levels and locations.   
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Appendix Table 1: Mean of Selected Sustainable MFI Characteristics used in the Study 
Items  Credit 
Unions 
NBFIs NGOs Rural 
Banks 
Other 
Banks 
MIX-
MFIs 
1. Yield on GLP (nominal, %)       
a New 31.25 41.30 37.77 39.95 38.00 39.10 
b Young 27.88 41.44 37.82 35.65 33.91 37.78 
c Mature 21.45 33.33 33.40 29.21 29.37 30.89 
d Small scale 25.28 43.10 37.80 34.46 46.81 36.94 
e Medium scale 23.73 38.99 33.43 28.41 43.33 33.66 
f Large scale 18.85 31.27 30.10 26.66 28.08 28.83 
g All MFI sample 23.01 36.58 34.31 29.94 31.17 32.86 
2 Financial expense (% GLP)       
a New 6.19 5.01 3.71 4.02 4.68 4.79 
b Young 6.66 6.95 4.12 6.87 7.53 6.10 
c Mature 5.30 6.86 5.99 7.80 7.80 6.41 
d Small scale 5.29 5.24 4.71 7.51 4.46 5.16 
e Medium scale 7.15 6.89 5.35 7.60 5.82 6.33 
f Large scale 4.76 7.47 7.55 7.27 7.98 7.31 
g All MFI sample  5.66 6.53 5.53 7.50 7.37 6.16 
3 Operating expense (% GLP)       
a New 28.16 39.71 42.03 37.78 51.25 40.13 
b Young 18.35 28.50 28.17 29.84 29.56 26.99 
c Mature 15.04 22.59 24.98 17.85 19.09 21.71 
d Small scale 19.00 37.93 32.73 21.00 55.23 30.99 
e Medium scale 14.85 27.94 23.77 19.81 42.86 24.11 
f Large scale 13.52 18.12 17.96 16.52 18.61 17.65 
g All MFI sample  16.61 26.99 26.43 19.52 24.53 24.48 
 Provision for loan impairment (% GLP)       
a New 1.93 1.69 1.84 0.54 4.29 1.96 
b Young 1.37 2.41 1.61 1.50 3.27 2.05 
c Mature 1.44 2.54 3.40 0.83 2.07 2.53 
d Small scale 1.35 1.92 1.87 0.90 2.54 1.72 
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e Medium scale 1.54 2.73 2.53 0.84 2.58 2.27 
f Large scale 1.69 2.47 6.05 0.87 2.58 3.28 
g All MFI sample  1.47 2.34 3.00 0.87 2.58 2.37 
4 Net profit (% GLP)       
a New -1.46 -2.12 -2.97 4.65 -6.72 -2.41 
b Young 2.48 4.42 4.16 7.13 1.72 3.87 
c Mature 2.00 3.94 0.02 5.20 5.04 2.19 
d Small scale 1.52 0.34 1.10 5.85 -0.67 1.29 
e Medium scale 1.98 4.11 3.12 5.27 0.83 3.36 
f Large scale 2.16 4.46 -4.27 4.31 3.76 1.76 
g All MFI sample  1.78 2.91 0.48 5.32 2.96 1.99 
5 Portfolio at risk after 30 days (% 
GLP) 
      
a New 3.67 3.92 1.76 13.76 5.76 3.83 
b Young 5.62 5.22 3.76 9.22 4.85 4.93 
c Mature 8.24 6.30 7.09 10.94 5.38 7.25 
d Small scale 7.46 5.28 6.68 12.33 8.29 6.87 
e Medium scale 7.05 6.15 6.48 11.00 6.14 6.88 
f Large scale 7.45 5.43 5.02 8.04 4.89 5.51 
g All MFI sample  7.34 5.57 6.23 10.91 5.32 6.42 
6 Average loan balance per borrower 
(per capita GNI) 
      
a New 1.09 1.17 0.32 0.44 2.42 1.06 
b Young 1.18 0.77 0.31 0.62 2.27 0.82 
c Mature 1.33 0.68 0.34 0.59 1.97 0.74 
d Small scale 1.33 0.87 0.23 0.58 0.61 0.65 
e Medium scale 1.14 0.80 0.35 0.54 1.63 0.68 
f Large scale 1.30 0.73 0.51 0.66 2.32 1.07 
g All MFI sample  1.27 0.80 0.33 0.58 2.08 0.79 
7 Female borrower (% total 
borrowers) 
      
a New 57.09 62.77 77.45 47.35 41.04 63.42 
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b Young 54.14 61.20 79.77 53.62 41.42 64.41 
c Mature 56.82 59.52 75.16 50.65 57.63 65.65 
d Small scale 51.90 61.81 79.05 43.11 53.03 66.85 
e Medium scale 77.85 60.48 74.34 54.04 61.31 68.61 
f Large scale 39.90 59.59 71.94 61.50 50.69 59.84 
g All MFI sample  56.27 60.59 76.02 50.79 52.62 65.15 
8 Borrower per staff member       
a New 71.49 103.02 149.94 111.71 423.92 143.25 
b Young 104.89 127.56 155.25 107.40 116.51 130.89 
c Mature 118.08 138.32 158.30 107.60 113.91 139.03 
d Small scale 
82.20 103.85 149.39 96.13 45.98 118.74 
e Medium scale 
141.86 114.28 159.22 113.35 182.40 139.55 
f Large scale 
142.79 160.66 171.34 120.23 162.10 160.37 
g All MFI sample  
111.32 128.84 157.23 107.81 153.62 137.88 
9 Equity capital (% total assets)       
a New 
24.93 44.68 49.27 25.58 41.82 42.28 
b Young 
27.32 40.16 43.12 15.88 22.35 36.75 
c Mature 
29.81 28.96 37.16 15.67 20.27 30.58 
d Small scale 
31.81 48.12 44.65 19.66 36.15 41.00 
e Medium scale 
30.13 35.37 36.53 13.97 37.92 32.99 
f Large scale 
20.06 22.83 29.84 13.55 19.14 23.17 
g All MFI sample  
28.86 35.05 38.98 16.26 23.30 33.16 
Notes: (i) Definitions of variables are provided in Section 2 in the text. They are abstracted from MIX 
market database at: www.mixmarket.com. (ii) The categories New, Young and Mature MFIs have 
been in operation for 1 to 4 years, 5 to 8 years and more than 8 years respectively. (iii) The group of 
Small scale MFIs have gross loan portfolio (GLP) outstanding of less than US$2million in SSA, Asia, 
ECA and MENA. The figure for Latin America is less than $4 million. Medium-scale MFIs have GLP 
of between US$2million and US$8 million in SSA, Asia, ECA and MENA. The corresponding figure 
of Latin America is between US$4 million and US$15 million. Large scale MFIs in SSA, Asia, ECA 
and MENA have GLP of more than US$8 million while those in Latin America have GLP of more 
than US$15 million. 
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Appendix Table 2: Pairwise Correlation Analysis: Kendall’s tau-b 
Sample 2005 to 2010 
Included observations after adjustment: 3980 
 LYLD LFELR LOPELR LPFLR LPRFTLR LPAR30 LALPBP LWBP LBPSM LECAR 
LYLD 
1.000 
         
LFELR 
0.159*** 1.000 
        
LOPELR 
0.478*** -0.042*** 1.000 
       
LPFLR 
0.148*** 0.026*** 0.167*** 1.000 
      
LPRFTLR 
0.176*** 0.001 -0.052*** -0.124*** 1.000 
     
LPAR30 
-0.032*** -0.008 0.066*** 0.247*** -0.188*** 1.000     
LALPBP 
-0.210*** -0.018* -0.225*** -0.014 -0.013 0.085*** 1.000    
LWBP 
0.099*** 0.002 0.121*** -0.022** 0.011 -0.132*** -0.389*** 1.000   
LBPSM 
-0.035*** -0.026*** -0.112*** -0.017 0.051*** -0.132*** -0.349*** 0.285*** 1.000  
LECAR 
0.118*** -0.309*** 0.153*** -0.002 0.153*** -0.028*** -0.059*** -0.013 -0.035*** 1.000 
Notes:(i) Asterisks *,**,*** indicate the statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels respectively. No asterisk means that the coefficient 
is not statistically different from zero. (ii) Definitions of variables and expected effects on interest income are provided in Section 2.2 in the text (iii) An L in 
front of a variable’s name is for the natural logarithm. The measures of adjusted equity-to-asset ratio (LECAR) were expressed as the natural logarithm of one 
plus the respective variables in order to reduce the range of variation and surmount the problems associated with negative observations. According to MIX, 
the equity variable is adjusted for donations and other forms of subsidies(iv) Data is taken from the website of the MIX market at: www.mixmarket.com 
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Appendix Table 3: Regression results 
Dependent variable: Natural log of portfolio yield (LYLD) 
Methods: Panel two-stage least squares 
 Column 1 Column 2 
Explanatory variables Model 1 Model 2 
CONSTANT 0.179 [12.47]*** 0.350[14.12]*** 
MATURE 0.005 [0.55] -0.005 [-0.56] 
MSCALE 0.052 [5.93]*** 0.004 [0.41] 
LSCALE 0.046 [3.78]*** 0.017 [1.40] 
MATURE*MSCALE -0.041 [-3.94]*** 0.0002 [-0.02] 
MATURE*LSCALE -0.051 [-3.98]*** -0.002 [-0.14] 
MICROBANK 0.048 [0.60] 0.297 [4.22]*** 
MATURE*MSCALE*LSCALE*MICROBANK -0.032 [-1.60] 0.010 [0.47] 
LFELR ….. 0.016 [7.25]*** 
LOPELR ….. 0.074[14.09]*** 
LPFLR ….. 0.041 [1.04] 
LPRFTLR ….. 0.143[11.46]*** 
LPAR30 ….. 0.002 [1.31] 
LWBP ….. 0.004 [0.99] 
LBPSM ….. 0.010 [1.99]** 
LECAR ….. -0.008 [-0.52] 
LALPBP ….. 0.224 [0.01] 
LALPBPSQ  -0.114 [-0.01] 
Cross-sections included 1112 952 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations 6663 3980 
Adjusted R-squared 0.512921 0.869733 
F-statistic [probability] 7.25 [0.000]*** 19.54[0.000]*** 
Durbin-Watson statistics 1.71 2.04 
Notes: (i) Asterisks *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence level 
respectively, (ii) Numbers in [….] are the estimated t-statistics, (iii) The dependent variable of all the 
models are the natural logarithm of nominal portfolio yield variable (LYLD), (vi) Definitions of 
variables are provided in Section 2.2 in the text. For brevity, estimates for cross-section and time-
period dummies are not reported here, but are available from the author on request. 
 
